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ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE: HOW CAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO 
OVERCOMING INEQUALITY?   
5 September 2017, Windhoek 
AFRICAN-EUROPEAN PARTY DIALOGUE OF SOCIALISTS & DEMOCRATS. 
Overcoming Inequality as a Political Challenge 
Robert Kappel 
Over the past ten years, the EU and Africa have built a strong partnership, enshrined in the Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). Today the European Union (EU) is collectively Africa‘s main foreign 
investor, its principle trading partner, a key security provider, and its most important partner in 
development and humanitarian assistance. At the end of November, 2017, African and European 
Heads of State will meet in Abidjan for the 5th Africa-EU Summit. This high-level event will discuss 
African-European partnership and start debating the renegotiation of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA), which remains a highly relevant framework.  
Since the mid-1990s African countries have been experiencing a period of increased GDP growth and 
real GDP per capita growth. Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Africa have also increased 
due to investment in African resources and growing African markets. More investment in services, 
construction and consumer sectors indicate a discreet shift to more labour-intensive industries. 
Economic performance and competitiveness has also improved in some African countries. Moreover, 
Africa is diversifying, the digital transformation is fast, and African enterprises have started to 
integrate themselves into regional and global value chains (GVCs).  
Still, these encouraging trends are often fragile and not yet inclusive or sustainable enough to offer 
better prospects for a large part of the population, and especially for Africa‘s growing number of 
young people. Many countries have been unable to reform and to recover from conflict and from 
fragility. Many countries still face severe constraints on their sustainable economic development and 
overall economic growth on the African continent is slowing down. Poverty is widespread and 
inequality is on the rise. Today every country in Africa is less equal than it was in 2010; the trickle-
down benefits of economic growth have been relatively small. Branko Milanovic (2016) shows that 
the concentration of wealth in Africa in the hands of the wealthy is a long-run global trend. Africa’s 
long-term decline towards inequality is the outcome of an increasingly capital-driven economy, 
which spur GDP growth but partly drive inequality. IMF and World Bank have forecast an average of 
about 3% economic growth for sub-Saharan Africa over the couple of years, though it warned that 
“extreme poverty remains high across the region”. Their reports show deepening inequality across 
the continent.  
By 2050, Africa‘s population will be 2.4 billion people. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) needs to create 18 
million new jobs each year up to 2035 to absorb new labour market entrants, compared to the three 
million formal jobs created during the last years. Given the small size of the formal sector a majority 
of young people will be forced to work in the informal economy. The way these changes will be 
managed politically and economically will define the future of the continent. The causes of rising 
inequality in Africa are a matter for debate also in the EU-Africa negotitions.  
Africa-EU relationship is forced to redefine their partnership in 2017, mainly due to the following 
reasons: 
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- In a changing global environment, Africa is experiencing profound economic, political and 
societal changes, and its importance to the internal and external dimensions of Europe‘s security 
and prosperity is becoming ever more obvious. Europe and Africa can gain from increased 
political and economic cooperation. 
- Africa’s deep structural transformation requires prospective and fundamental realignment, incl. 
the concepts and strategies beyond ‘traditional’ development issues. 
- Trade relations: The African Union (AU) and the African states identify external trade as one of 
the key objectives, incl. increased intra-regional trade in Africa.  
As overcoming inequality is an overarching topic, this paper will deal with the following main 
question: How can economic relations between Africa and Europe contribute to overcome inequality 
and asymmetries and reduce inequality, poverty and unemployment? The first chapter outlines 
major tasks of EU-African partnership. The second chapter explains the dynamics of inequality on the 
African continent and why growth in SSA is not closely linked to reduced inequality. The third chapter 
evaluates growth and structural change of African economies. It will deal with new trends in African 
development and why it is necessary that EU-African cooperation requires a revision of their agenda, 
regarding industrial development and employment creation. The conclusion of the paper will deal 
with strategies and concepts for economic cooperation having in mind that inequality is related to 
poverty, unemployment and limited life chances of many Africans, who are forced to migrate and 
survive in informal economies. 
1. Partnership reloaded 
There is a common perception among Africans that the relationship between Europe and Africa is 
not a partnership between equals. In fact, there is a strong feeling that the EU defines the agenda 
and the rules of the game. In reality Europe is divided, it does not speak with one voice, several EU 
member states have their own bilateral policies, sometimes in contradiction with EU-African policies. 
Developing the partnership requires more than overlapping and competing agreements, such as the 
JAES, the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy towards North Africa, 
and the South African Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement. Also on the African side 
many voices are heard. Africa’s strategic ideas for future cooperation with Europe are not easily 
understood, and the institutional capacity of the AU is rather weak. European and African actors 
repeatedly stress their desire to build a partnership beyond a donor-recipient relationship. 
Nevertheless, the vested interests created by the aid industry make it difficult to end the dependency 
syndrome. Europe and Africa are forced to work together. What is needed is an agreement based on 
mutual interests and shared global agendas, to tackle the enormous challenges ahead. It is time to 
build a strong political and economic partnership that is more than a continuation of the existing 
framework (Laporte 2017). The Africa Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
should be part of any future strategic orientation.  
2. Inequality on the rise 
The last 15 years of high SSAs growth has seen levels of income inequality remained broadly 
unchanged. Some countries experienced declining poverty. Yet, this was mainly due to a gradual 
development of poverty incomes to income levels just above the poverty line, while few countries 
experienced a substantial expansion of the “middle class.” Within SSA, income inequality is highest 
among middle-income and oil-exporting countries, such as South Africa and Angola. SSA also remains 
one of the regions with the highest gender inequality. Over the last years, there has been strong 
growth in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania. Nevertheless, poverty 
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is rising. Growth seems to be delinked from the majority of the African population. In recent years, 
per capita income growth has not been sufficient to reduce income inequality in SSA. Indeed, on 
average for the region, higher GDP per capita growth appears to have been accompanied by higher 
inequality.  
While the high levels of income inequality in SSA are partly driven by the structural conditions, such 
as the dependence on resource production, low-level of diversification and industrialisation, 
widerspread informal economies, low agricultural productivity and weak integration in markets, the 
evidence also points to policies that influence the access of poor households and enterprises to 
opportunities in growing markets, and in education and health. Education inequality has declined, 
and health indicators generally improved. However, average educational attainment remains low 
compared to other regions. In addition, access to quality education and health care remains by and 
large restricted to the wealthy due to insufficient resources to pay for these services, and limited 
geographical access (especially in rural areas). 
3. Africa’s rapid growth and structural change 
Large sections of the sub-Saharan population have experienced an improvement in their quality of 
life over the past ten years; some of the Millennium Development Goals were even reached (school 
enrollment rate, life expectancy, health care). But the main goal, to decrease the number of people 
living in poverty by 50 percent, has not been met. Most of the 49 countries in SSA have registered 
positive economic growth in recent years. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates as well as 
export growth rates have been quite high. However, scholarly analyses have also clearly shown which 
factors are impeding the economic advancement of SSA.  
Economic growth varies greatly from country to country. The more fragile states (approximately 25 
percent of all African countries)1 are recording growth rates of less than four percent, and only some 
countries top six percent. Using the growth acceleration criteria laid out by Hausmann, Pritchett and 
Rodrik (2005), sustainable growth can be established in only half of African countries. Many African 
countries have also been able to achieve high growth rates in exports, but Africa’s share of their 
exports of manufactured goods is especially low, having sunk below one percent.  
Will growth of the last several years prove sustainable? The following points indicate that sub-
Saharan Africa faces immense challenges in this regard:  Future growth perspectives seem to be less 
optimistic compared to the last decade. SSA growth is projected to rise only about three percent 
until 2020, and African output growth is expected only moderately to exceed population growth. 
Many commodity exporters still need to adjust fully to structurally lower commodity revenues 
because commodity prices remain low. Many of the largest non-resource-producing countries will 
find it increasingly hard to sustain growth through higher public capital spending, in the face of rising 
public debt. Rising indebteness is becoming a cause for concern in SSA. On average, the ratio of 
public debt to GDP has increased to an average of 42 percent of GDP in 2016.  
African countries in general face external and internal challenges. On the internal side, further delays 
in economic adjustment policies and political developments pose risks in some countries. On the 
external side, the global outlook comes with significant uncertainties and downside risks (fiscal policy 
easing and expected rise of interest rates in the USA and EU). 
As was demonstrated high growth rates are not necessarily accompanied by a structural 
transformation towards a modern economy, resulting in the creation of jobs in the industry sector. 
                                                          
1
 Based on IMF and World Bank criteria, laid down in their resp. African economic outlook. 
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On the contrary, in many African countries agricultural migrant workers are employed in the low-
productivity informal urban services sector. On average, less than four per cent of the population is 
employed in the manufacturing industry. In short, African economies are characterised by three main 
trajectories: (1) resource dependence with a capital-intensive form of production and limited 
employment generation, (2) small manufacturing sectors, and (3) informal labour in the services 
sectors. The informal economy is estimated to account for 61 per cent of urban employment and 93 
per cent of all new jobs created overall in sub-Saharan Africa. This dynamic reveals a tendency not 
only towards large capital-intensive local and foreign companies, but also towards microenterprises 
in the low-productivity, traditionally labour-intensive informal sector and the existence of only a 
small medium-sized enterprise sector.  
In general SSA faces huge challenges and chances: 
- In most countries, the growth process was triggered by an increased demand for natural 
resources and agricultural products. These countries can profit as long as they engineer a 
structural change toward industrialization. They have access to the resources they need in order 
to diversify, but many countries find themselves stuck in a “resource trap”. 
- African agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) need to be developed. They 
have demonstrated marginal growth, and almost no growth in productivity has been recorded in 
the agricultural sector. Due to the low inflow of FDI in the processing and technology-intensive 
sectors, technology transfer is limited. Increasing productivity represents an important 
requirement to compete on a global level. 
- With the exception of exporting natural resources, sub-Saharan African economies play a small 
role in the global economy. This marginalization limits opportunities for broader-based foreign 
trade. A stronger integration into GVCs would heighten the demand for African labour and create 
new employment opportunities.  
- Diversification, especially in terms of the composition of exports, is an important factor 
supporting the resilience of periods of growth in the region. A high level of the share of exports 
of manufacturing products appears to be particularly beneficial, presumably because 
manufacturing exports are associated with higher value-added content and less volatile prices. 
Countries with relatively high levels of product diversification are enjoying ongoing growth 
accelerations. 
- In most SSA countries, the infrastructure is insufficient, even though improvements have been 
made over the last years. The often poor physical infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, railways, 
electricity) has limited development of domestic and regional markets and of trade. Removing 
infrastructure deficits can be seen as significant. 
For a long time Africa’s FDI inflows and growth were centred on natural resources and capital 
intensive sectors. However, the structure of FDI is starting to change and more foreign and local 
investment in services, construction and consumer sectors indicate a discreet shift to more labour-
intensive industries. FDI in manufacturing, construction, trade services, transport, ICT, etc., has 
resulted in growing employment and positive labour productivity growth. This is mainly the case in 
urban hubs and in sectors that are integrated in GVCs (car production, food production, ICT sector, 
horticulture, textiles, etc.). Among all the jobs directly created by FDI in Africa between 2003 and 
2014, 83 per cent were located in cities. Over the same period, FDI in manufacturing is estimated to 
have directly created more than 646.000 jobs; FDI in services, 281.000 jobs; FDI in high-tech, 159.000 
jobs; and FDI in resources, 220.000 jobs. Productivity growth in these sectors is the sine qua non of 
long-term development. Generally, the stronger integration of African countries into GVCs may also 
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foster the absorption of technology and skills from FDI, and thereby enhance structural change and 
promote inclusive growth.  
4. Recommendations 
Fifteen years after the CPA was signed, ACP-EU cooperation has not achieved its stated objectives. 
What remains is an asymmetrical partnership restricted to governments and based largely on 
unilateral aid flows. The challenges confronting Africa-EU cooperation are not simply a question of 
‘improving implementation’. The appropriateness and effectiveness of the framework itself is the 
core issue.  
There is a widely shared acknowledgement of the timeliness and importance of redefining the EU-
Africa partnership in view of the challenges the two continents face. Cooperation with Africa had 
become a stronger priority for Europe, not just because of the challenges refugees and migrants pose 
for EU member states and their domestic constituencies, but also because of economic opportunities 
and competition with China.  
Economic trends that shape Africa and to some extent Europe (climate change; rural-urban 
migration, digitalization, and demographic change) are not sufficiently reflected in the EU‘s and 
African approaches for strategic cooperation and in the prioritization by decision makers. What 
should be emphasised is that the relationship between the two continents should go beyond 
development cooperation and focus more on trade, investment, technological partnership and 
employment. In doing so, the historical donor-recipient relationship should be transformed towards 
an interest-driven approach of mutual engagements of African and European states, civil society, 
trade unions and business, exploring the scope for joint strategic activities. The question is no longer 
what Europe could do for Africa but rather what Europe could do with Africa and/or what Africa 
could do with Europe. The Africa Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals should form 
the core of any future strategic orientation.2  
Which are the main objectives that can support employment creation, poverty reduction and thus 
tackle the problem of inequality? There are many possibilities, but the focal points are trade, support 
of structural transformation and direct and indirect measures to reduce inequality, which will be 
dealt within this paper.  
 
1. Reduce inequality 
Many analyses show that high inequality has had a detrimental effect on growth performance 
primarily in low-income countries. Weaker infrastructure, lower levels of investment in fixed and 
human capital, higher dependency ratios, and lower quality of institutions were key factors 
explaining this growth shortfall. Reducing infrastructural deficits (access of much more people to 
electricity, roads, clean water), higher investment in education and vocational training and getting 
more unemployed to work could boost SSAs average annual per capita GDP growth substantially.  
Despite some progress in reducing income inequality in SSA over the last 20 years, Africa continues 
to be characterized by comparatively high levels of inequality. Addressing inequality could yield 
important growth payoffs. Given that inequality varies from country to country, and in view of the 
multiple factors driving inequality, policies must be tailored to country-specific situations and take 
                                                          
2
 The paper does not include a full list of activities, major ideas and recommendations were formulated in JAES, 
the CPA and many other strategy documents. 
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into account administrative capacity and potential trade-offs. In the context of efforts to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals, good progress has been made in alleviating poverty as well as 
boosting primary school enrollment. Building on this progress, SSA should accentuate its efforts to 
reduce inequality in support of more rapid and inclusive development in the context of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Carefully designed policies are key to continued progress in reducing 
inequality and enhancing inclusiveness in the region.  
Some instruments are of major importance, but others have limited reach. An example is the effect 
of financial sector deepening. Recent findings show that at early stages of development, financial 
sector deepening can aggravate inequality by mainly benefiting higher-income groups that already 
have financial sector access. But enhancing women’s access to financial services seems to have 
played a role in reducing income inequality. There is also evidence from household surveys that even 
health and education spending are mainly benefiting the well-off, instead of facilitating access to the 
poor that are crucial to reduce inequality. Other structural features of SSA economies also appear to 
be associated with higher inequality. The region’s continued high fertility rate limits the share of the 
working-age population, thereby postponing the expected “demographic dividend” in terms of 
lowering inequality. This underscores the importance of accelerating the demographic transition by 
raising investment in human capital. 
African activities 
Redistributive policies through taxes and transfers and government education spending will lead to 
reductions in inequality and do not adversely impact growth. Fiscal policy should focus on redressing 
the regressivity of taxes and expenditures.  
1. Well-targeted expenditures on health care and education are needed.  
2. Reform of tax systems: SSA is increasingly relying on value-added tax (VAT) revenues. VAT is by 
nature a regressive tax, but this is mitigated in many countries by substantial recourse to VAT 
exemptions and reduced tax rates for basic goods. However, this approach is a poorly targeted 
redistributive tool because most revenues foregone accrue to the better off. The progressivity of 
specific tax measures should be assessed taking into account the distribution of the benefits of 
the additional expenditure they finance. For instance, in some cases, a regressive tax may be the 
most efficient way to finance strongly progressive spending. Financial sector deepening alone 
could aggravate inequality. Therefore, it should be accompanied with reforms aimed at 
facilitating access to financial services for all. New technologies like mobile banking have the 
potential to facilitate access and should be complemented by other measures that reduce costs 
and enhance efficiency, such as establishing or strengthening credit and collateral registries. 
Joint activities 
3. Most important are investments in infrastructure. Access to basic infrastructure and utilities such 
as clean water and electricity to poor households, particularly in rural areas and for women will 
reduce regional inequality (see G20 Compact with Africa). 
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2. Reform Trade 
The implications of reciprocal free trade agreements between the EU and the five subregions in SSA 
have been fiercely contested. The question remains, however, under which conditions benefits of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) can outweigh their risks. The EU, the AU, the regional 
economic organisations and African states should ensure that the EPAs contribute to the realisation 
of the economic goals of the AU’s 2063 Agenda.  
So far, only one regional (EPA) has been ratified to date in SSA. The EPA with the Southern African 
group entered into force on 10 October 2016. Interim agreements with individual countries have 
been ratified by Côte d‘Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, Mauritius, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and the 
Seychelles. Difficult negotiations are ongoing at the regional level, with the East African Community 
(EAC) group being at odds on signing a regional EPA, as some members (Tanzania, Uganda) are 
willing to renegotiate while others (Kenya, Rwanda) are eager to sign and ratify. 
The EU Communication published in May 2017 stresses that the EPAs should offer a stable and 
predictable framework for EU-Africa trade relations. The EU also offers support for the preparation 
of a continental free trade zone, but it is not quite clear to which extent EPAs enable or hinder its 
realisation. An in-depth analysis of the likely direct effects of the EPAs on African economies, their 
respective labour markets, and the promotion of intra-regional trade in Africa would be useful in 
putting the debate on a more objective footing.  
The majority of the SSA countries have not been able to take many advantages of the Cotonou trade 
preferences because many African are not competitive and on the European side protectionism is 
widespread.Trade and market information is often not avalaible, and access to European markets is 
limited. These obstacles need to be removed if African countries are to achieve sustainable trade and 
economic development. This means that a debate is urgently needed on free and fair trade, on non-
tariff-barriers, on the future of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), and on the EU‘s agriculture 
and industry subsidies. This a wakeup call: the EU can no longer neglect the comprehensive 
disadvantages for African farmers and industries. 
Given the huge challenges of structural transformation, trade policy activities should focus on: 
African activities 
4. Import tariffs: liberalisation will lead to reduction of import revenues (up to 30 percent of total 
revenues of governments). These losses are a huge burden for many African countries, which 
need to be addressed by governments by adapting their domestic tax systems.  
5. Policies that deepen the complementarities between FDI and domestic investment should be 
promoted to ensure inclusive growth. Strong FDI linkages with the domestic economy can also 
result in a greater diffusion of knowledge, technology and know-how by the lead firms. In some 
middle-income and non-resource-dependent countries, an important channel for potential 
spillovers is the collaboration of foreign investors with local institutions, incl. local universities, 
research institutes and training institutes. Special funds of both partners will spur cooperation 
and enable necessary transfers, which will also benefit SME. 
EU activities 
6. In order to enable or easing exports and access of African entrepreneurs to European markets, 
both sides should establish Joint African-EU Business Centers in many SSA countries, and not only 
European chambers of commerce in African states. Their tasks is the strengthening of value 
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chains (adapting to international standards, norms), easing of market access for African 
companies, diffusion of information, networking, coaching, partnering and supporting African 
and European enterprises on their respective markets. 
Joint activities 
7. Intra-regional trade is of major importance. The EU can support all concrete activities by funding 
measures of countries which will open up their markets, incl. compensation for losses due to 
adjustment costs (EDF „Aid for Trade“-programme). Foreign and intra-regional trade can be 
suported through sustainable customs reform and modernisation support. 
8. Supporting preparations for a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). SSA requires EU investments 
in the intra-regional infrastructure, with special focus of integrating poor countries, which will 
reduce continental inequality. Linking strong African countries with small and fragile low-income 
countries creates positive contagion effects. This adds to the G20 „Compact with Africa“ which is 
not benefitting low-income countries (Kappel, Reisen 2017). These measures will facilitate 
private sector industrial investments, incl. agro-food value chains in order to integrate farmers in 
remote areas into urban and intra-regional markets. 
All measures will add to African competitiveness and beneficial participation in global markets, 
thereby reducing asymmetries. They will also support the development of internal markets which will 
help to create jobs and reduce poverty. The analysis also makes it clear that trade and trade policy is 
related to the ongoing African transformation process. 
 
3. Support structural transformation and inclusive development 
Sustained, sustainable, and inclusive growth is needed more than ever to respond to the aspirations 
of a growing and young population for better living standards and to provide opportunities and 
chances for millions of African workers. This would require huge reform activities at a time when 
unfavorable external conditions are pressing in most African countries. 
In order to drive structural transformation in Africa, some policy prerequisites are seen as key: apart 
from political and macroeconomic stability, these are opening of markets, improvement of 
infrastructure, incl. roads, electricity etc., leading to the reduction of trading costs. Job creation in 
SMEs requires barriers to be removed. Regional economic integration is essential for Africa to realise 
its full growth potential, to participate in the global economy and to share the benefits of connected 
global markets. Institutional investments (for developing the infrastructure) and FDI can benefit 
Africa.3 FDI, in turn, requires modern infrastructure, especially energy and connectivity, to fully 
deploy its external benefits. 
Africa is tasked with industrialization and modernization of agriculture in order to create jobs and 
raise the level of income for the poor. More direct investments should flow into industry and 
agriculture. Only in this way can a sustainable growth occur, one that is characterized by the parallel 
and combined development of agriculture, agro-industry, light industry, industrial clusters and SMEs. 
Only then will the requisite number of jobs be created for the large number of unemployed. 
                                                          
3
 The “Compact with Africa” (2017) has suggested a great number of “‘policy commitments”’ for African 
partner countries that are deemed necessary to facilitate private infrastructure and corporateFDI, see Kappel, 
Reisen 2017.  
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Based on the analysis of trends and the channels that are expected to drive structural transformation 
in Africa, the following policy measures are key: 
African activities 
9. Macroeconomic and political stability and attractive general investment conditions are 
prerequisites for long-term growth. Regulatory quality and a positive overall institutional 
environment are important, not just for attracting FDI and stimulating domestic enterprises, but 
also for enhancing economic performance. Business and attractiveness indicators indicate that 
African countries have not fully utilised their potentials. Instruments such as export subsidies, 
duty drawback schemes and the like exist, but have only been effectively implemented in a few 
African countries.  
10. Enhanced participation in GVCs has also been associated with more inclusive growth, especially 
when the sectors targeted are labour-intensive and employ relatively lower-skilled workers. 
Reaping the benefits of GVC integration requires a change in industrial policy. Shifting its focus 
from developing a national industry to upgrading in GVCs (identifying niche activities) is essential. 
African economies can benefit most by specialising in particular segments of a value chain. 
Governments can foster foreign firms to create linkages with the domestic economy and 
strengthen links with domestic suppliers. This could be achieved by introducing tax incentives, 
competitive fonds and local content requirements, including joint ventures. 
11. Most important is a strategy of raising productivity and efficiency levels through industrial 
clusters. Economic and technological upgrading is no longer merely a consequence of ad hoc 
industrial synergies but rather becomes a pivotal factor influencing local innovation systems. 
Successful upgrading takes place primarily at the local level. Especially in connection with 
increased employment at enterprises that are integrated in networks, value chains and clusters, 
this model of growth in productivity and efficiency appears capable of contributing to the 
reduction of poverty. Supporting clusters through business services, better transport systems, 
training of qualified labour, cooperation with research institutions and access to electricity would 
help to enable connectivity and improve the competitiveness and innovative capacities of SMEs. 
Improving job creation in SMEs requires barriers being removed, enabling SMEs to grow while 
supporting young people to become entrepreneurs and create their own jobs. Start-up 
programmes, funds for young entrepreneurs, easier access to finance, pro-active support 
programmes for SMEs and business services can drive innovation and job creation.4  
12. Informal firms can grow when they no longer face their main constraints (i.e. limited access to 
finance, electricity, and land). Informal enterprises are an important component of the 
economy—providing jobs for the large and growing working-age population. Therefore, policies 
should foster the productivity of informal enterprises rather than policies to increase tax 
revenues collected from these enterprises.  
European activities 
13. In the light of the huge challenges regarding structural transformation, competitiveness, 
unemployment, and trade related GVC, there is the fundamental challenge that African countries 
largely lack highly qualified labour. This can partly be tackled by fostering long-term cooperation 
                                                          
4
 One should bear in mind that many industrial strategies – in particular the establishment of technology and 
industrial parks and SEZs – have not been very successful in Africa, either with regard to job creation or 
technology development. Those experiences should be carefully evaluated. 
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in education: on the one side, it is necessary to offer ten thousands of scholarships every year for 
African students for their studies in Europe (lesson to be learnt from China), and on the other 
side to help upgrade universities, applied universities, joint European-African universities and 
research institutes. Boost research and university cooperation should be related to business 
sector. The German DAAD model of Country/In Region Scholarship Programme –Strengthening 
Higher Education and Research in Africa could be regarded as a European role model. The DAAD 
model also supports radiation of intra-African cooperation of universities, and collaborative 
research, incl. mobilisation of European and African expertise in research and innovation. 
Joint activities 
14. EU and Africa should foster joint activities of African and European companies, incl. incentive and 
competitive funding systems for technology and knowledge transfer. Special competitive funding 
program for European SMEs and medium sized African enterprises should be launched. 
15. African countries and the EU should undertake continued efforts - on the African side supporting 
local investors and FDI, and on the European side facilitating their enterprises to invest in Africa. 
For example, the German Marshall Plan with Africa focuses on investment incentives for German 
companies. Moreover, African states, together with the EU, may consider establishing an African 
–EU investment guarantee mechanism to enable European enterprises to invest in African states 
without undue fear of bankruptcy.  
 
Some of these economic policies have been formulated in many countries and are documented in 
strategy papers of the AU, UNECA, regional bodies and national governments, with respective 
concrete measures, funding and capacity building activities. African governments are in the driver’s 
seat. The EU can support and should support African governments and not supersede and push aside 
African initiatives. The EU – Africa cooperation is in need of a strategic cooperation that ends 
disadvantages and asymmetries. This includes the phasing out of aid-driven cooperation and should 
pursuit a paradigm shift and learning from EU strategic cooperation activities with China and other 
emerging countries. JAES and successive roadmaps formulated good intentions and have also 
resulted in some useful projects and programmes, but the political and economic African 
environment has changed. There are new external challenges, new actors and deep changes in the 
globalisation process, which makes it necessary to redefine the EU-Africa agenda. Africa –EU 
economic and development co-operation objectives (poverty alleviation, sustainable and inclusive 
development, employment, reducing asymmetries and inequality) may not be achieved unless all key 
partners address the challenges of structural transformation and trade relations between the two 
continents.  
As Africa seeks to claim the 21st century, it should diversify its economies from commodity 
production to the industrial sector, and to small and medium scale industries that create jobs and 
add value to the production chain. The major challenge in many developing countries is to create 
jobs in sufficient quantity and quality (decent jobs) to meet the needs of the labour force. Reducing 
inequality requires policies that foster dynamic structural change. Inclusive and sustainable 
development can be achieved with an integrated policy framework with growth-promoting and job-
generating macroeconomic policies and industrial policies. More broadly, to increase the chances of 
SSA countries catching up with developed countries and reduce inequality, coherent macroeconomic, 
industrial, trade, environmental and social policies that reinforce each other should be implemented. 
Joint activities of EU and SSA can set the course. 
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